Abstract:
This paper presents three propositions about tax collection in local authorities in Tanzania.
First, revenue performanee depends on the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement.
Second, the extent of coercion depends on the bargaining powers of the stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement process. Inparticular, the 'balance of power' between elected councillors and the local government administration is important. Third, the presence of donors ' in a local authority may be crucial by changing the 'balanee of power' with implications for accountability and democratie development. These results may explain why we observe widespread dtfferences in revenue performanee between local authorities.
Introduction 1
In recent years there has been an increasing focus on the possible linkages between high levels of development aid and taxation in Afrca. Without aid, governents would have to cut spending, raise taxes, or borrow from other sources. Thus, it is argued, high levels of aid may diminish a governents incentive to make full use of its domestic resources for revenue generation (Brautigam and Botchwey, 1999; Moore, 1998) .2 Some development agencies have responded to the critique levelled against them by introducing various incentive schemes to reduce the assumed free riding problems by recipient governents, and thereby increasing domestie tax effort. Thus, in mary aid dependent Afrcar countres revenue targets have become a major component of the aid conditionality.3 For instance, the International Monetar Fund argues that Afrcan countries 'have significant potential for raising tax receipts by broadening the tax base, improving tax administration, and rationalising the tax system' (Hadjimichael et aL., 1995:44) . Furthermore, some donors' involved in district deve10pment programes, have adopted matching schemes, i This paper is based on research caried out in collaboration with Joseph Semboja whom I would like to thank for comments and advice. Thanks also to Hildegunn Nordås, Lise Rakner, Lars Sørgard, Ole Therkildsen and Bertil Tungodden for constnictive comments. Points ofview and possible errors are entirely my responsibility.
Financial support from the Research Council ofNolWay and the Collaborative Agreement between CMI and the Moore focuses on the anti-democratic effects of aid dependency. Re argues that by the means donors use to promote development in the poorest countres, they are undermining the values of democracy and good governance that they are otherwise trying to promote through 'general' political conditionality and specific aid interventions. 5 Moore's point of departre is the acknowledgement that bargaining over the budget and over tax policy is one of the primary ways in which different state and societal goals are reconciled in a democracy. For instance, in Europe over the past two centuries, taxation and disputes over the use of revenues stimulated the development of greater citizen rights and privileges, with democratic institutions enforcing accountability and greater transparency in expenditures (Tily, 1992 ).
Moore's key proposition is that the more a state 'earns' its income through the operation of a bureaucratic apparatus for tax collection, the state needs to enter into reciprocal arrangements with citizens about provision of services and representation in exchange for tax contrbutions.6 Thus, the larger share 'eamed' incornes represent of total revenues the more likely it is that state-society relations are characterised by accountability, responsiveness and democracy. In many cases, however, aid dependency may thwar these processes in Afrca.
4 For instace, Heller (1997:39) calls the tax effort in most African countries 'disappointingly low'.
5 Democracy in this context is understood as a sub-species of a broader concept: the accountability of state to society (Therkildsen, 2000) . This political accountability is about those with authority being answerable for their actions to the citizens, whether directly or indirectly. Day and Klein (1987:26-27 ) make an important distinction between political and managerial accountabilty, the latter being about makng those with delegated authority answerable for caring out agreed tasks according to agreed criteria of performance.
Afrcan states have significant 'uneamed incomes in the form of foreign aid (Goldsmith, 2000: 18) . Aid alone now accounts for almost half the income of many governents of lowincome countres. Therefore, many Afrcan governents seem currently to face more organised and effective pressures for accountability and transparency from the international donor agencies than from their own citizens and parliaments (Brautigam and Botchwey, 1999) .
The purpose of this paper is to explore the possible linkages between taxation and accountability in a poor aid dependent countr. In particular, does the social contract argument that Moore us es appropriately specify the political and administrative problems of a poor country? Furthermore, who are the likely stakeholders involved in the domestic tax enforcement process, and how does the presence of donors influence their relative bargaining power? What impact wil such presence have on domestic revenue generation? Local authorities interact more closely with the citizens than other organs of the state apparatus, and hence provide a good case for exploring these questions at a disaggregate leveL.
The paper draws on findings from research carred out in local authorities in Tanzania during the late 1990s. Thefieldstudies were conducted in Kibaha Distrct Council, Coastal Region, and Kilosa DC, Morogoro Region. The studies covered all three council levels; the distrct headquarters, the wards and the vilage leveIs. In addition, data on tax revenues for about 50 councils were collected from the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Governent.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents briefly the empirical background for the analysis. In section 3 we discuss why different levels of revenue raising effort may be observed in local authorities, which have very similar socio-economic characteristics. Section 4 examines the institutional set-up for taxcollection, emphasising the roles of tax collectors and elected councilors in the tax enforcement process. Thereafter, in section 5, possible impacts of donors are explored. Finally, section 6 concludes.
The cases
Total tax revenues per capita reveal substantial differences between councils. In 1995, in a sample of 20 councils, reported revenues per person above the age of 18 ranged from TSh 344 in Lindi DC, to TSh L ,527 in Njombe DC. Some of these differences may be explained by different economic structures, revenue bases, population densities, incomes per capita, and the level and quality ofpublic services. However, we also observe varations in tax effort between councils that apparently have fairly similar socio-economic characteristics, such as Kibaha DC and Kilosa DC.7 How do we explain these observations?
We wil use the experiences with the head tax, locally named 'development levy', as our frame of reference. Development levy is the single most important local governent tax base in Tanania. In 1997, for an average of 42 distrct councils development levy generated about 30 percent of the total reported local revenues. The levy is, in principle, levied on every person above the age of 18 years and ordinarily a resident in the area. Women are exempted in most councils. In district councils the tax is in generallevied on a flat basis. In contrast to most other local tax bases that are based on agrcultural outputs and, thus, may fluctuate according to annual rainfall (e.g., market fees and crop cesses), development levy is In principle a fairly stable revenue base. Therefore, it is an attractive tax base for local authorities.
The ratio between development levy revenues reported to the distrct treasury and projected revenues (based on population statistics) differs significantly between the two councils. For instance, in 1996 the collection ratio, referrng to revenues collected in per cent of the estimated tax potential, was 26.7 per cent in Kibaha DC, compared to 45.6 per cent in Kilosa.
Thus, although the statutory tax rate per head was the same in the two councils in 1996 (TSh 1,000), the effective rate, measured as revenues per eligible taxpayer, was more than 60 percent higher in Kilosa compared to Kibaha (table 1). 
Coercion
How do we explain the different tax collection ratios between the councils? We suggest the following proposition:
Diferences in tax effort between local authorities are due to variations in the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement.
The evidence supporting this proposition emphasises the importance of different tax enforcement regimes, and, thus, the relationship between the state apparatus and the citizens.
Analytically, the relationship between a taxpayer and the (local) governent contains at least two elements (Cowell, 1990; Levi, 1988) :
. The coercive element.
This refers to the bureaucratic apparatus that the local authority deploys to collect revenues. It is represented by the enforcement activities of collectors and the penalties imposed on those detected for non-compliance, i.e., the organisational effort. This has to do with reciprocity, i.e., how far citizens are obtaining some reciprocal services in retum for their tax contributions. Thus, taxation and the provision of public goods and services may be interpreted as a contractual re1ationship between taxpayers and the (local) governent.
It should be noted that there is always a coercive element in taxation (Andreoni et aL., 1998) .
However, to minimisethe costs of enforcement and to maximise the output that can be taxed, the governent has to create some kind of voluntary compliance.8 First, the governent must create confidence in its ability and its capacity to deliver promised retums for taxes. Second, to reduce the problems of free-riding it must co-ordinate the actions of taxpayers so that each perceives others paying their share (Levi, 1988:53) .
Most taxpayers are of course not able to assess the exact value of what they receive in retum from the governent for taxes paid. However, it can be argued that the taxpayer has general impressions and attitudes conceming ms own and others' terms of trade with the governent.
If this is the case, then it is reasonable to assume that a taxpayer's behaviour is affected by his satisfaction or lack of satisfaction with his terms of trade with the governent. Thus, if the system oftaxes is perceived to be unjust, tax resistance may, at least parly, be considered as an attempt by the taxpayer to adjust ms terms of trade with the governent. 9
Taxpayers in local authorities in Tanzania see few tangible benefits in retum for the taxes they pay. Virtally no deve10pment activities are undertaken through councils' financial sponsorship, and even the existing capacities are not producing the expected services due to lack of operation and maintenance funds Therkildsen, 1992, 1995) . The deterioration and in some cases non-existence of public services raises taxpayers perceptions of exploitation from an unequal contract with governent, and promotes tax resistance.1O
Taxpayers' perceptions of the quality ofpublic servces in Kilosa and Kibaha are presented in table 2. Dissatisfaction seems to be most widespread in Kilosa where 75 percent of the respondents considered the quality to be bad (compared to 66 percent in Kibaha). None of the respondents in Kilosa considered the public services to be good (compared to 6 percent in Kibaha). 77 percent of the respondents in Kilosa said the quality of the services today was worse thanthree years ago (the corresponding figure for Kibaha was 66 percent). Scott (1985) argues that one of the most importt 'weapons of the weak' is the ability to withdraw compliance. Ths can take a passive form, such as shirking, or an active form, such as rebellon. Historically, unwilingness of the population to comp1y with a tax that is deemed unjust has been a cata1yst for political action. The Boston tea part and the Thatcher poll tax are ilustrative examples. Bates (1983) provides some examp1es from Afrca.
io Enemu (2000:181) reviewing the problems and prospects of 10ca1 govemance in Africa supports this argument.
Furthermore, 83 percent of the respondents in Kibaha DC answered that in their view taxes was 'only partly' or 'not at all' used to provide public services. The corresponding figue for Kilosa was 88 percent (the majority, Le., 70 percent, answered 'not at all'). Taxpayers' perceptions were supported by the tax collectors interviewed.
Widespread tax resistance is observed in the studyareas. People may take to the extreme to evade taxes, for instance, by literally hiding in the bush when tax collectors are approaching.
In particular, the revenue administration in Kilosa DC relies heavily on simple physical coercion to obtain the resources they need from their subjects and to ensure compliance. The argument that tax resistance is correlated to deteriorating public services is supported by other studies. Bukurura (1991:91) refers to an investigation from 1987 by the Tanzania News Agency in Kigoma Town Council, which reported that 'many people were defaulting apparently because they thought the council was not doing its best to serve the residents'. Tripp (1997:154) describes non-payment ofdevelopment levy as a form ofpopular opposition towards state policies. She argues (p. 8) that tax evasion may be understood as one of many forms of 'quiet strategi es of resistance in the form of economic non-compliance'.
Thus, in circumstances where taxes are perceived to be unfair and people receive few tangible benefits in retum from taxes paid, we wil expect that only coercive methods of tax enforcement wil generate tax revenues. The reciprocity or contractual relationship between taxpayers and the local governent is absent.
11 Cases of tax revolts are aIso reported from councils in other regions, including Kilimanjaro Region and Coastal Region. Daily News (28 November, 1997:5) reports that '(o)ver twenty Moshi Municipal Council workers who were on a special operation to net development levy defaulters were attcked by a mob at Mbuyuni Market on Wednesday afternoon and eight ofthem were injured, some seriously ..'.
The institutional set-up for tax collection
Why do the tax enforcement regimes differ between the two councils leading to substantial differences in the use of coercion? We suggest the following proposition:
Coercive tax enforcement is facilitated when the 'bargaining powers' with respect to tax collection are in the favour of the council administration, and the elected councilors have no direct injluence on collection.
The arguments and observations supporting this proposition focus on the stakeholders involved in tax collection, and their relative bargaining power. Local governent tax collection is basically a council's staff affair and completely separated from the central governent revenue authority (i.e., the Tanzania Revenue Authority). In district councils it is organised around three levels, name1y the council headquarters, the ward and the vilage leveIs. At the sub-vilage level, the kitongoji leader is responsible for mobilising taxpayers.12
At the district headquarters the responsibility rests with the council treasury, headed by the District Treasurer (DT). At the ward leve1 the responsibility for tax collection rests with the office ofthe Ward Executive Officer (WEO). The WEO also handles deve10pmental and law and order functions at that level. For this purpose the local militia are to their disposal. In larger wards which may possess greater revenue potential there wil also be a ward revenue collector (WRC) to spearhead revenue collection in the ward. At the vilage leve1, the responsibility rests with the office of the vilage executive officer (VEO). The VEO is also responsible for vilage developmental issues. The vilage executive officers are nominated to their position by the vilage governents, but appointed and employed by the district counciL.
The system of nomination ensures that the VEO has to come from the vilages. At the subvilage level the kitongoji leader assists in mobilising taxpayers.
This institutional set-up is characterised by at least three principals: (i) the administrative leadership (management team) of the local authority, (ii) local politicians and (iii) the central governent administration (i.e., Ministry of Local Governent). These stakeholders, 12 Distrct and urban councils are sub-divided into wards (kata). Curently there are about 2,400 wards in Tanzania, and more than 9,000 registered vilages. Each vilage is supposed to have at least 250 households (kayas). Vilages are sub-divided into vitongoji. On average there are about 3 vitongoji per vilage. sometimes independent of each other and sometimes through collusion tr to influence the revenue target and, thus, the actions of the tax collectors. Based on evidence from fieldwork, we present the following propOSitiOllS about the stakeholders' objectives: However, since both revenue estimates and reports on revenue collection are based on information from the administrative staff, there is room for manufacturing numbers. These observations are consistent with Migdal's (1988:253) argument that political systems under pressure from the centre to produce certain development results are likely to exercise their own form of accommodation. The most common form is simply to pass false or inflated accounts of development results to superiors who are out of touch with local conditions. Thus, where supervision is lax, distrct leaders, inc1uding local bureaucrats, may use their budgetar discretion and the force at their disposal for personal gain.
(ii) One important objective of local politicians is to get re-elected (and thereby also to achieve sitting allowances when participating in council meetings). Politicians may say they want an effcient tax administration, -but only to the point at which voters begin complaining that they are being harassed. Councilors are, in general, re1uctant to raise local taxes and charges, not only due to concems about their popularity, but also because they may be major local landowners or businesspeople who consider higher taxes as having direct negative impact on them. As aresult councilors try to intervene in revenue collection.
13 In the book 'Africans. The history of a continent John Ilffe (1995:196) discusses the priorities of the colonial administration. Re quotes a veteran native commissioner in Southern Rhodesia who remembered his duties as follows: 'Get to know your district, and your people. Keep an eye on them, collect tax if possible, but for Gods sake don't worr headquarters.' To some extent Ilffe's description from the colonial period reflects the present district official's approach in Tanania: Don't worr headquarers, Le., the central governent. To achieve this it is necessary tocollect enough revenues to pay the salaries of the 10cal employees, otherwise complaints wil be forwarded though the trade unions.
Indications on the impacts of political intervention in tax collection can be found in the councils' financial statements. For instance, many councils experience revenue shortfalls in election years, paricularly with respect to development levy. In a sample of 48 councils, 31 experienced a drop in revenues in the election year 1995.14 This might be due to the influence ofpoliticians (inc1uding local and. central governent politicians). In both Kibaha and Kilosa we were informed that CCM-politicians (the ruling par) tred to moderate the tax collectors' efforts to enforce taxes durng election years by issuing statements such as 'don't harass taxpayers' or 'relax on tax collection'. Politicians from the opposition paries, in contrast, approached taxpayers directly and advised them 'not to pay taxes', since taxes, according to their view, were used to 'finance the CCM-governent'. Such statements are said to be common during election years.
(iii) The objective of the central government administration (i.e., the Ministr of Regional Administration and Local Governent) is vague with respect to taxation. However, a tax system is also a mechanism ofpolitical control. According to Moore (1998:105) , it comprises two main elements: (1) the sets of information on citizens that a governent otherwise might not collect and maintain; and (2) sure that this machinery is alive, is that the local authority generates sufficient revenues to cover its wage bil.
By and large, however, the central governent is not much directly involved in mattersof local governent taxation. For instance, the tax by-law system gives local authorities in Tanzania quite a wide discretion to introduce new local taxes and to set tax rates, subject to ministerial approval. Due to lack of capacity and poor co-ordination between the central and local governent only limited restrictions are in practice imposed by the centrallevel on local governents' tax design. Therefore, the local revenue systems have developed without much interference from the centralleveL. 15
14 Based on data from the Ministr of Regional Administration and Local Governent. 15 Laek of eo-ordination between the central and loeal levels has led to duplieation of taes and inconsisteneies between taxes imposed by 10eal authorities and the national governents development polieies (e.g., with
Social networks further complicate the picture outlined above. Such networks may play important roles on how tax enforcement is carred out in practice. In societies where family-, tribal-and ethnical relations are strong and important, it is expected that civil servants provide services to these. Tax collectors at the vilage level are, as mentioned above, recruited from the vilages. Traditional networks may thus impose heavy constraints on the collector's actions, inc1uding who is targeted to paying taxes and who is to be exempted.
In our survey we found, for instance, that taxpayers who had migrated to the studyareas from other regions in Tanzana were more compliant than people who were bom in the area.
Migrants seerned (not surprisingly) to be less integrated and had looser relations to local authorities, inc1uding tax collectors, compared to people bom in the area. Furthermore, we found that migrants, in general, were relative1y more wealthy than people from the area. Thus, we would expect that it is easier and probably more convenient for the tax collector at the vilage leve1 (i.e., the Vilage Executive Officer), who lives in the vil age and is nominated to his position by the Vil age Council, to target migrants rather than people from the area who might be his relatives, neighbours or who are related to local politicians and authorities.
In contrast to the ambiguous motivations of the vilage level collectors, tax collectors at the ward and district levels seem to be driven by motivations to maximise revenues. Thus, tax collectors can report sufficient revenues that cover the wage bil and pocket whatever is left, with or without collusion with their superiors.16 The larger the amount collected, the larger the amount that can supplement their own meagre salaries.
To summanse, the vanous stakeholders involved in tax enforcement have divergent objectives with respect to tax collection. In particular, political pressure seems to be a major impediment to revenue collection. Political intervention sometimes results in conflicts between the revenue administration and local politicians. For instance, a general view respect to export promotion). An ilustrative example is the cess rate on cashew nuts, a major export crop, which in 1997 represented 20 percent of the price paid to producers in Kibaha DC, creating huge disincentives for export production. In border areas, smuggling has become extensive due to relatively high 10cal cess rates on some crops, for instance on coffee. Thus, peasants dodge and manoeuvre to avoid the deprivation inflicted upon them by public policy.
16 Corrption is often embedded in the hierarchical strcture of the bureaucracy (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:49).
Low-levels offcials collect bribes and pass a share to those at higher leveIs. Conversely, higher-ups may organise and rationalise the corrpt system to avoid wasteful competition between lower leveIs. This system has some similarities with sharecropping systems in agriculture. Sharecropping is a land-tenure system where the expressed by the tax administration in our study was that elected councilors obstrcted tax collection and were talking 'cheap politics'. Such conflicts seem to be rooted parly in divergent objectives with respect to tax enforcement, and partly in lack of trust between administrators and politicians at the local leveL. Based on data from 14 district councils Jacobsen (1999) finds that there is a 'trust deficit' in the political-administrative relations at the locallevel in Tanzania. Furthemiore, lack of trust seems to reduce the flow of information between politicians and bureaucrats.17
The conflict between the tax administration, including collectors, and local politicians is particularly evident in Kilosa De. Local politicians have little influence on the tax enforceient process. Collection is facilitated though extortive and violent approaches that are mainy advocated and impleiented by council administrators, with minimum support from local politicians. Thus, in the absence of democratic forms of accountabilty, tax collection in Kilosa has tued into a licence for collectors on-the-ground to more or less freely augment the local treasury and supplement their own salaries through extortion from local residents.18
Thus, in accordance with Mamdani's (1996: 59) notion of 'decentralised despotism', financial autonomy has provided the framework in which lower-level officials resort to extra-legal enforceÌnent and violence to extort money from the population. 1bs arguent can be ilustrated by a few examples. For instance, the statutory volunta period for paying development levy in Tanania is from 1 January up to September 30. All tax payments made after the deadline are subject to a penalty equivalent to 50 percent of the tax rate. As from October 1 to December 31 development levy payment 'campaigns' are conducted, organised by the ward office and using state organs, such as the local militia and judiciar, to ensure compliance. Defaulters may be visited in their homes, or people may be required to show their tax receipts at roadblocks. Non-compliers who are caught are brought to cour at the primary court or ward leveL. Due to widespread resistance, tax campaigns for development levy in Kilosa De (involving the militia) start as early as in July, i.e., three months before the voluntar (and statutory) payment period expired. The district treasury staff argued that by waiting to the end land10rd gets a (percentage) share of agricu1tura1 output, and the tenant keeps the remaining output (Sah and Stig1itz, 1992) .
17 Conflcts between council emp10yees and 10ca1 politicians are, however, not a new phenomenon in Tanzania. Dryden (1968: 144-149) , referring to the mid-1960s, describes some areas of conflict between these stakeho1ders.
18 Wunsch (1990:54) based on Hyden (1983) argues that in circumstances where national leaders were dogmatic on implementing comprehensive programes, as Tanzanian leaders were durg the late 1970s regarding of September, taxpayers' would have spent their money and nothing would be left for taxation.
Furenore, in Kilosa the vilage level has been excluded from collection, and tax enforcement has been taken over by the ward level. According to the distrct treasury staff, this was. due to incentive problems connected with tax collection at the vilage level. One problem arises from the presence of two principals for the Vilage Executive Officers (VEOs), i.e., the vilage governent as the nominating authority and the council as the appointing and employing authority, leading to divided loyalty. Another problem arises from VEOs operating within their areas of domicile. Lack of arm's-length-relationship between tax collectors and taxpayers introduces economics of affection into vill age tax collection. In many villages the kitongoji leaders also resist in mobilising people to pay taxes due to theunpopularty oftaxation.
In Kibaha De, too, tensions between the administration and councilors are observed, although much less pronounced than in Kilosa. In general, tax collection in Kibaha is characterised with more laxity compared to Kilosa due to the intervention of politicians. In some wards in Kibaha local politicians partly act as executives. A general view expressed by the tax collecting staff, reflecting their frstration on this intervention, was that councilors obstrcted tax collection. The expected consequence of this intervention is reduced tax effort.
Thus, this simple analysis suggests that tax effort depends on the relative 'bargaining power' between the elected councilors and the management of the counciL.
Donors
Why do the relative influence of the council administration and local politicians on tax enforcement vary between councils? We suggest the following proposition to explain these Though distrct development programes donors often exert strong influence on the behaviours,decisions and actions of local authorities' adminstrators and politicians. Generally, donors co-operate with council administrators and staff to implement their activities, usually though the creation of paralleI strctures. Ths intervention increases the influence and power of the bureaucracy, at the expense ofthe political system.19 In Kilosa DistrctCouncil, which has a long history of donor support, we found indications that this was indeed the case.20
Since donors, as noted above, increasingly use revenue generation as an indicator of the performance of the councils they are involved in, ths may fuher empower the management leve1.21 One strategy donors have used to reduce the problems of free riding by local councils has been to adopt a matching scheme, which supplies aid only on the basis of matching funds from the local governent. According to Catterson and Lindahl (1998:20) , this has 'created strong incentives for revenue collection' in Tanzania. Furthermore, donor support may cushion council administrators against possible taxpayers' opposition. Servce provision through donor supported activities provides a free riding opportnity to council adminstrators who often claim to be the providers of such services. 22
Kibaha, in contrast, has experienced limited donor support. As noted above, local politicians there play an important role in tax enforcement, and tax collection is characterised with more laxity compared to Kilosa. The leve! of corrption (both absolute and relative) also seems to be lower in Kibaha compared to Kilosa. This might be because local politicians in Kibaha to some extent carr outinformal monitoring of the collectors. In general, the formal monitoring and auditing devices do not function (or even exist) at the locallevel in Tanania. 19 This argument is supported by other studies. In a comprehensive study on the role of governent in adjusting economies, Batley (1999) reports that public sector reformprogrammes pushed by donors and emphasising technocratic solutions, lead to increased managerial power without a strengthening of the accountability of the managers to politicians and the public. 20 The Irish funded 'Kilosa Distrct Rural Development Programme' (KRDP) was initiated in 1979. In 1994 it was one of the largest distrct development programmes in Tanzania (Mullen et a1., 1995) .
21 Changes in the performanee of decentralised institutions have tended to be studied pricipally in terms of financial performanee or revenue mobilisation (Crook and Manor, 1998:8) . For instance, in a study explorig the detenninants of success in Afrcan local governents, Smoke and Olowu (1992) define success mainly in terms of fiscal performance. 22 However, people in Kilosa seem to be well aware about who is providing the various services, and distinguish between 'council services' and 'donor provided services'. For instance, the main lOads in Kilosa which have a fairly good standard due to donor funding, are 10cally referred to as 'Irish lOads', while the almost non-passable feeder lOads are named 'council lOads' .
Concluding remarks
This paper has explored the reasons why revenue-raising performance may differ between local authorities in Tanzania. The analysis shows that coercion is likely to be an integral par of the tax collection methods.Furthermore, the study shows that the involvement of donors at the 10calleve1 may have at least two impacts on tax enforcement: (i) Donors' presence may induce increased tax effort, however, (ii) at the expense of accountability and democratic consolidation.
Thus, Moore's (1998) proposition that the more a state (in this case a local governent)
'eams' its income through bureaucratic tax collection, the more likely is the state-society characterised by accountability and democracy, is not supported. In contrast, we tind that increased tax effort is achieved through coercive methods often characterised by violent forms of enforcement. The reciprocal element between the state and citizens seems to be absent in connection with local governent taxation in Tanzania.
However, the analysis supports Moore's argument that donors, by the means they use to prornote deve1opment, may undermine democracy and good govemance. For instance, matching arrangements which supplies development aid on the basis of matching funds from the local governent may lead to increased extortion by empowering the administration at the expense of theelected councilors. Harsh tax enforcement in situations with poor service delivery may thus contribute to further undermining the legitimacy of the governent and increase tax resistance.
The results presented in this paper emphasise the importance of knowing how local governent institutions work as a prerequisite to make good policy decisions. In certain contexts extemal interventions may have impacts that are contrary to those intended. Such interventions may contribute to undermine the legitimacy of the local governent and hamp er democratic development by dis-empowering the political organs oflocal authorities.
Furtermore, the emphasis on revenue targets does not seem to acknowledge other major impacts of the tax system. Many local revenue bases in Tanzania perform poorly with respect to the basic principles of taxation: They are often distortionary and costly to administrate, and deteriorate both horizontal and vertical equity. Attempts to squeeze additional revenues from is poorly designed taxes may, therefore, have negative effects on the economy and society in general. However, these issues do not appear to be recognised neither by local authorities nor donors whose main concem simply seems to be to increase tax revenues -at any costs.
The paper provides us with some directions for further research. In particular, there is a need for more research on (i) the impacts of deve10pment aid on revenue collection, and (ii) processes of democratisation. Firstly, the role of donors in relation to tax systems in poor aid dependent countries is a fairly unexplored area of research. Through district deve10pment programes donors have often exerted strong influence on the behaviours, decisions and actions of 10ca1 authorities' administrators and politicians. A comparative study of tax collection in councils with varying degrees of donor support may shed light on this and other issues, inc1uding the possible impacts on revenue generation of the ongoing democratisation process. Secondly, many issues of accountability are unexplored. For instance, are citizens in poor countres likely to be able to hold bureaucrats (and politicians) accountable? In improving our understanding of tax compliance behaviour in deve10ping countries, there is also a need for more thorough examination of the apparently important concept of fairness in the exchange between taxpayers and the governent.
